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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law & Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International Hellenic 
University. 
The contribution of Societas Europaea was that it established an much as possible 
common company model and helped also to the mobility and establishment of the 
internal market, but at the same time it had as a result new problems to raise, mainly 
concerning the contribution of workers in the management of the company. In order for 
the above-mentioned problem to be solved it was adopted the principle of “before and 
after”, which however, was not completely successful. In the next section it is made a 
reference to the national legal provisions of the member-states trying to protect the 
already existing rights of participation of the employees in the management of the 
company. After that it is made a quite extensive reference to the efforts, which have 
been done in order to be achieved a mix of an as much as possible legal cultures. A 
prerequisite was the establishment of systems of negotiations.  After that is made an 
extensive reference to the omissions of the SE Directive and the points being relevant 
with the participation of employees which have to be corrected, in order for the 
constitution of the Societas Europaea to be spreaded in Europe during the financial 
crisis. Finally it is made a reference to the theoretical approach of the SE and the 
possible future improvements. 
I would really like to thank Professor Dr Thomas Papadopoulos who as my 
supervisor during the writing of the Dissertation helped me as much as possible, 
Professor Dr Komninos Komnios who as my mentor during my studies in the 
International Hellenic University helped me also to be in a position to write that 
dissertation and last but not least  Professor Dr Athanasios Kaisis who not only has 
organized a postgraduate programme of studies having a real European character but 
at the same time does everything in his power to improve it season by season. 
Keywords: 1) Societas Europaea, 2) common company model, 3) principle of 
“before-after” .   
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Preface 
The main goal of that dissertation was to explore the already existing status quo 
ruling the establishment and the participation of the employees in the constitution of the 
European Company or Societas Europaea and to find the disadvantages of the already 
existing legal regime in order for them to be improved.   
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Introduction 
In order to appreciate the value of the constitution of the “European Company” or 
“Societas Europaea” regarding its contribution to the financial sector of the European 
Union the first thing we have to do is take a short flashback in the history of the 
European Union, or more correctly, at that time, of the European Communities even 
before the initial inception of the “European Company”.  For a long period of time the 
only way of two or more companies, which wanted to have a close co-operation was 
that of the mergers or acquisitions, something that was, in some cases quite difficult 
and even more importantly time-consuming, which was as a result, also money-
consuming. Examples of this occurrence, are the examples of Unilever, Royal Dutch 
and Shell, Reed Elsevier, Fortis, Rothmans International, Smith Kline and Beecham, 
Eurotunnel, RTZ-CRA and, earlier, AGFA/Gevaert, Pirelli-Dunlop, VFW-Fokker, and 
Hoogens- Hoesch (Estel).   Until that period, when only national laws regarding the 
creation and the structure of the European Company were existing, it was 
characterised nearly impossible from the point of view concerning the company law to 
establish a company under the form of European Company because of the fact that the 
tax status quos could, and in practice, be an obstacle of great difficulty. However, 
despite the fact that, for a long period of time the main problem regarding the 
establishment of the European Company concerned the complicated tax status quo 
and as a consequence regarding the financial status of the company, another important 
problem, which was raised was also that of the contribution of the employees of the 
company to its management1. The above-mentioned matter is of significant importance 
because of the fact that it is closely relevant to the freedom of mobility. In most 
countries being European member-states the procedure of the movement of one 
member-state to another of the registered office of the company was impossible if the 
company wanted to keep its own legal identity, as it was set as a prerequisite the 
liquidation and dissolution of the legal identity in the first country and the formation of a 
completely new legal identity in the territory of the second country. It was at that time,  
after the adoption of the Regulation EC No 2157/2001 and at the same time with the 
adoption of Directive 2001/86/EC, which supplements the so-called Statute for the 
European Company, regarding the involvement of employees in the management of 
the company, in 2004, that the European Commission published a document dealing 
                                                 
1 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company” , (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 4, first and second paragraph of subchapter 1 . 
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with matters regarding the transfer of the seat of one company from one country to 
another, however, without leading us to a proposal for a directive, even by  June 2005. 
However, despite the fact that during the period between 1986 and the end of 2003 the 
Court of Justice of  the European Community delivered quite a wide number of 
judgements, which set a new level on the matter of the various complexities regarding 
the issue of cross-border transfer of the head offices within the Community, the 
conclusion which the above-mentioned judgements have led to is that companies from 
one member-state have the freedom to set up their branches in other member-states, 
even in the case in which they don’t pursue any kind of activities in the home member-
state2. The conclusion, which is made by what is already mentioned is the fact that, in a 
single market, such as that of the European Union, the existence of a model of a 
European Company is an element of “sine-qua non” in order for the single market to be 
integrated3.  
As far as the involvement of the employees in the management of the company is 
concerned, it should be noted at this point that the inception of the participation of the 
whole of the employees in the management of the European Company is dated back to 
the original inception of the European Company. It was at the mid-seventies, more 
specifically in nineteen sixty-six (1966), when it became obvious to a Professor named 
Piet Sanders, who prepared the first draft of the Statute for the European Company 
that a new model for the company sector was about or should be about to be created4. 
According to other authors, such as Erik Werlauff, the original idea of the creation of 
the constitution of the “European Company” is attributed also to Professor Piet 
Sanders, but in an even earlier period, which is dated back to 19575. There is also a 
third opinion, according to which the original idea of the creation of a European 
                                                 
2 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 5, third and fifth paragraph of subchapter 1 . 
3 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.),  “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 6, sixth paragraph of subchapter 1 . 
4 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 16, first paragraph of subchapter 2. 
5 Werlauff Erik, “SE-the law of the European Company”, (2003), Djof Publishing, Copenhagen, chapter 1, 
page 1, fourth paragraph of subchapter 1.1. 
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Company was perceived in 1959 when Professor Pieter Sanders published the idea of 
the creation of a European Company at his speech in the University of Rotterdam6. 
The concept of the employee participation, which under the provisions of Directive 
2001/86/EC is referred under the term “participation”, should definitely be distinguished 
from the general term “employee involvement”, because of the fact that under the term 
“employee involvement” it is possible that other types of employee participation are 
included also. More precisely this Directive refers to three forms of participation, which 
as the follows: Information, consultation and participation. Because of the fact that the 
influence which can be exercised by the employees in one company is quite significant, 
this right can be exercised only under strict measures and rules by the employees’ 
representatives always concerning the affairs of the company. The employees’ 
representatives are either the employees who are elected or those who are appointed. 
Employees have the right to recommend and even in some cases oppose the 
members of the company’s supervisory or administrative statute. Of all the provisions 
of the directive and of all the different forms of the involvement of the employees in the 
management of the company, it is only one, participation, which actually affects on its 
own the management and through this the structure of the company. The procedure of 
information and consultation are in most cases done by a work council and very rarely 
by direct contacts, in which, both the representatives of the employees and the 
management of the company participate.  The Council Directive 94/45/EC, also known 
as the “European Work Council” Directive regards matters of consultation and 
information. In addition, the “European Work Council” Directive makes it obligatory for 
the companies, which are of a certain size to proceed with the negotiations in 
accordance with, what is called, a “Special negotiating body” of the representatives of 
their employees. In the case, in which,, there is no possibility of an agreement to be 
achieved, the 94/45 Directive again, provides us with a set of standard rules, which are 
written in the annex and mainly lead us to apply the same technique that has been 
applied in the above-mentioned directive7. Moreover, there is also another kind of 
element which makes the adoption of the above-mentioned directive (2001/86/EC) as 
easy as possible, which is none other than the principle of  “before and after”, which as 
far as the involvement of the employees in the decisions taken by the company is 
                                                 
6 Gold Michael, “Employee participation in the EU: The long and winding road to legislation”, 
(25/10/2010) abstract, chapter titled “The European Company Statute and the Draft Fifth Directive”, 
page 13, paragraph 1, available in the site of sagepub (www.sagepub.com) in 9/1/2017. 
7 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 17, second paragraph of subchapter 2. 
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concerned, it says that the basis for the procedure, according to the decisions taken in 
the European Company, should be the rights that the employees enjoyed, even before 
the adoption of the European Company model. These are referred in the provisions of 
articles four, paragraph four, article seven, paragraph two, article thirteen, paragraph 
three (b) and finally article thirteen, paragraph four of the above-mentioned provision. 
The above principle also says indirectly that where none of the two or more companies, 
which participate in the creation of a European Company were, before the creation of 
the European Company, governed by rule, which offered employees the opportunity to 
be involved in the management of the initially separate companies, such rules 
(meaning rules under which the participation of the employees in the management of 
the new company is allowed), are not going to be applied in the new-created company 
also. Furthermore, the principle of “before and after”, is applied not only as far as the 
participation of the employees is concerned, but also in the case in which the other 
forms of the employee participation are concerned, which are referred in the article 
thirteen (13), paragraphs one (1) and paragraph three (3), case (a) of the Directive 
2001/06/EC8.  Furthermore, under article 12 of the 2001/86/EC Directive the 
management of establishments of SE and the supervisory and administrative organs of 
its subsidiaries and of the participating companies, which are placed in a territory of a 
member-state all abide by the obligations set by Directive 2001/86/EC9. In the next 
chapter we will examine more specifically the participation of employees in the 
management of the company. 
1. Participation of employees in the management of the company 
1.1 Participation during negotiations 
As far as the core of the topic is concerned article three (3), paragraph one (1) of  
Directive 2001/86/EC sets the fact that under article two (2), paragraph (b), the 
companies which participate directly in the establishing of the European Company 
should take the necessary steps in order for the negotiations to be initiated between 
the representatives of the company. In addition, this must be done as soon as possible 
in order for the publishing of the terms of the merger or of the formation of the holding 
European Company or for a subsidiary to be transformed into a European Company to 
be published. The most important element on the part of the employees of the 
company is to create an SNB. In the case in which none of the initial companies, which 
                                                 
8 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 18, third paragraph of subchapter 2. 
9 Vaughan David CBE QC and Robertson Aidan QC, (ed.), “Law of the European Union”, issue 36, 
(2012),Oxford University Press, UK, section 20, chapter 11, part B, part 2131 of paragraph 10.  
  -5- 
have contributed to the creation of the European Company had, any employees before 
the merger or the acquisition, then, and only under this case it is impossible for 
negotiations, even to start, and neither article three (3) of the EC 2001/86 Directive, nor 
any other article of any other Regulation or Directive can be applied.  But how can the 
relevant legal provision be, which sets as a prerequisite the creation of a European 
Company be applied? The answer lies in a sensible interpretation of Regulation EC  
No. 2157/2001, which should be adopted, and accordingly,  we can assume that the 
establishment of European Company is possible, even in the case in which it is not 
possible for the employees to participate in the management of the company. However, 
it is possible that the same applies also in the case in which although the participating 
companies do not have employees, but do have the subsidiaries. It should be made 
clear that under the regime created by the legal provisions of Directive EC No 
2001/86/EC employees of a concerned subsidiary or establishment shall continue to 
play a role in the SNB. That is the reason why the possible exclusion of the employees 
by any influence on the creation of the European Company is a possibility, under 
certain circumstances, abuse10.  
However, there is still another case, according to which one of the two initial 
companies, which are going to form the European Company, have, always before the 
merger takes place, employees. In that case, which is in practice not so rare as it might 
be thought to be, it is obligatory for the new company to establish an SNB. After that, 
negotiations between employees and the main management of the company will take 
place, except for the case in which a qualified majority decides not to have the 
negotiations open to the participation of the employees. In that case, despite the fact 
that the company continues to have the possibility according to which can be 
registered, however, none of the provisions of the Annex to the Directive will be applied  
and in that case only the relevant national legal provisions will be applied. In this case 
the negotiations be continue for six months and in that case the result can be one of 
the following: The agreement concerning employee involvement is finally reached. This 
need not obligatorily involve employee participation. Instead, it may involve any kind of 
employee involvement, even including some or the whole of what they are called 
“standard rules”, which are laid down in the Annex of the Directive. The only legal 
provision which sets an obstacle as far as freedom of the negotiating parties is 
concerned is that which is to be found in article 4 (four), paragraph 4 (four). According 
to that article, in the case in which the European Company is established by 
                                                 
10 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1 , chapter 1, pages 18-19, subchapter 3.1. 
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transformation or in other words conversion, the agreement will provide us with at least 
the same level of employee involvement as the ones which were existing before the 
conversion of the initial company to the formation of the European Company. This fact 
has as a result that in the case in which the company was a subject of employee 
participation before the conversion, the European Company will be the subject of the 
same legal status quo. In addition, part 3 (a) of the Annex to the Directive also refers to 
the fact that the rules which concern the participation of the employees which were 
applied before registration will be applied also in the period after the creation of the 
European Company11.  Not any kind of agreement can be concluded because of the 
fact that either the SNB has decided, by a qualified majority to set an end to the 
negotiations, or because of the fact that in the end of one (1) year period, which has 
been set any kind of agreement could not be reached12. Another interesting topic is the 
fact that there is the possibility according to which in the case of merger of a German 
and single-tier British firm in which the British employees are more than the German 
ones there is the danger of not exporting the co-determination rights in the territory of 
the UK despite the fact that it is the most advanced and complicated way of 
participation of employees13.    
1.2 Possible consequences 
In the second of the above-mentioned cases it is not completely clear whether 
consequences they will exist and which exactly those will be. This happens mainly 
because of the fact that the legal provisions which are contained in both the Regulation 
and the Directive are in many cases contradicting each other. According to article 
number (7) seven, paragraph one (1), case (b) of the Directive the standard rules which 
will be applied, will be applied only in the case according to which no agreement has 
been concluded in the above-mentioned period. This means that there is also the 
possibility that in the absence of the acceptance by each of the participating companies 
of the standard rules, there is the possibility that no registration takes place. According 
to the above-mentioned, article 12 (twelve), paragraph two (2) of the Regulation 
                                                 
11 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK part 1, chapter 1 , page 19, subchapter 3.2, case (a). 
12 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 19, subchapter 3.2, case (b). 
13 Wanjiru Njoya, “Employee Ownership in the European Company: Reflexive Law, Reincorporation and 
Escaping Codetemination”, Legal Research Paper Series, University of Oxford, November 2010, paper 
No. 73/2010, part B, chapter 7, pages 22-23, first paragraph, available in the site of SSRN 
(www.ssrn.com) in 9/1/2017.  
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provides that the European Company may be registered, even when the period in 
which negotiations are allowed has expired, without an agreement to have been 
reached, but does not contain any reference as far as the acceptance of the standard 
rules are concerned. The above-mentioned happening seems to imply that the 
procedure of registration can also take place, even in the case in which the standard 
rules cannot be applied.  As far as the Law of the European Union is concerned, there 
is no provision which sets rules concerning the priority between Directives and 
Regulations. However, a reasonable interpretation of the above-mentioned provision 
would be that which lead us to the conclusion according to which , if on the date of the 
expiry of the period no agreement has been achieved, then we have no other option 
except to reach an agreement. But, the question still remains, what is going to happen 
if the standard rules are applicable? In that case the result maybe better compared to 
that which was actually expected. Most importantly, the standard rules may not be 
applied because of the Article seven (7), paragraph two (2) and in some cases 
paragraph three (3) of the Directive. Moreover, article seven (7), paragraph two (2), is 
that which sets quite numerous additional requirements concerning the applicability of 
the standard rules14. It has to be written at that point that principally the SE Directive 
has nothing to do with the national information and consultation and as a consequence 
work-place co-determination rights. As far as the Board-level-employee participation 
rights are concerned the whole solution is far more complex. For example, in the case 
an SE has been established in accordance with the form of a newly-established holding 
SE in its national subsidiaries the board representation remains completely untouched. 
On the other hand, if a company has been converted into an SE, the newly-founded 
board replaces the previously existing under the participation status quo of that certain 
country15.  In the next chapter we examine the national laws transposing the Directive 
in some member-states. 
2. National provisions transposing Directive 2001/86/EC 
2.1 Austria 
 Regarding the application of the Directive in each Member-State we can start by 
exercising the way in which the Directive was adopted in the country of Austria. In that 
case the majority of the provisions of the Directive were transposed into national law by 
an amendment to the Labour Constitution Act which adds an all-new chapter relevant 
                                                 
14 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), Volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 1, chapter 1, page 20, subchapter 3.2 and first paragraph of subchapter 3.3.  
15 Stollt Michael and Wolters Elwin, “Worker involvement in the European Company (SE) A handbook for 
practitioners”, (2011), ETUI aisbl, Brussels, chapter 2, pages 28-29, fifth and sixth paragraph of 
subchapter 3, available in the site of etui (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016. 
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to the participation of workers in an SE16. Article 3(2) (a) of the Directive, which is 
relevant to the composition of the Special Negotiating Body was adopted by the Law of 
Austria by the part 216 of the Labour Constitution Act. The composition of the Special 
Negotiating Body must be clear and according to the needs of the company must be 
defined. That actually means that the composition of the SNB has to be changed in 
case significant changes have occurred regarding the structure or number of 
employees of any kind of the participating companies.17 As far as protection of the 
representatives of the employees and the possible abuse of procedure is concerned, 
we can say that according to the Labour Constitution Act employee representatives 
enjoy special protection. More specifically the representatives are considered not to be 
negatively discriminated regarding payments or the possible opportunities for 
promotion. They are also protected against termination of their employment, meaning 
practically that they can be fired only in the case in which they are guilty of some very 
specific offences, which are referred to in sector 121 of ArbVG such as the denial of the 
employee to continue his work in another undertaking, different than that in which 
he/she had started, because of the closure of the first one or the employee’s inability to 
work at present or in the near future and finally the case in which  a  representative 
systematically denies to execute his/her working  obligations or persistently violates his 
or her working obligations and the employment relationship cannot be continued 
because of unreasonable lack of discipline18. However, despite the fact that 
representatives of the employees have the general obligation  to execute their usual 
working duties like the employees which are not involved in the representation of the 
whole of the employees, their payment is not allowed to be decreased because of the 
fact that the representative functions may have to be done during usual working 
hours19. The country of Austria did not make use of the optional provision, according to 
which there is a derogative from the obligation of transmitting information, if that kind of 
information, could be possible to irrevocably harm the functioning of the European 
                                                 
16 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed)., “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 5, page 134, subchapter 54.  
17 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 5, page 135, first and second paragraph of subchapter 56.   
18 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 5, page 139, subchapter 75 and footnote number 32 of page 139.  
19 Van Gerven, Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 5, page 140, subchapter 76.  
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Company and this decision is also the result of a prior administrative or judicial 
authorization (Art. 8(2) Dir.)20.  
2.2 Germany 
As far as employee involvement in the German SEs is concerned, we can refer to 
the fact that individual employment relationships are still to be unaffected by the 
formation of an SE. However, it is of extreme importance that special rules apply to the 
involvement of employees. That makes it necessary for a systematic study of the ways 
in which employees are involved, to make a clear distinction between involvement 
through a work council and involvement through the supervisory or administration 
body. The Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) and the various Code-
Termination Acts (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, Drittelbeteiligunsgestz, Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz) contain a kind of mandatory rules regarding employee 
involvement in national companies. While this is happening, on the other hand, the 
SEBG provides us with a more flexible approach, by setting a system of negotiations 
between management and labour21. The elections should take place in ten weeks after 
the provision of the information mentioned above. In the case where a works council 
does not exist, the Special Negotiating Body members shall be elected directly by the 
employees. Negotiations should start as soon as possible after the creation of the 
Special Negotiating Body and it is possible to last for up to six months. The parties 
have the opportunity to decide jointly whether they will extend the negotiations lasting 
up to one year after the establishment of the Special Negotiating Body (Sec. 20 (2) 
SEBG)22. In the case in which no agreement is possible to be reached, the legal 
provisions which are set in the SEBG are going to be applied (Secs. 22 and 34 SEBG). 
According to the above-mentioned provisions the formation of a works council is 
obligatory. The work council of an SE is totally incomparable to that of a German 
Company, which has adopted the model of co-determination rights. The works council 
of an SE needs only to have access to information and consultation about the current 
and future developments within the company. Regarding employee participation either 
in the administrative or supervising body, the rules which are contained in the SEBG 
                                                 
20 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul, (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 5,  page 140, subchapter 78. 
21 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 9, page 253, first and second paragraph of subchapter 30. 
22 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 9, page 254, fourth and fifth paragraph of subchapter 30.  
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shall be applied23. The above-mentioned shall be applied if first of all an SE which has 
been created after a conversion has at the same time applied the rules relevant with 
the co-determination even before the conversion, secondly if before the establishment 
of an SE by a merger, the rights of co-determination  were existing in at least one of the 
participating companies in which in the worst case 25 % are involved of the total 
percentage of the employees of the whole of the participating companies, and finally if 
the holding or subsidiary SE, had adopted the model of  co-determination rights 
existing in one or more participating companies in which they are employed in the 
worst case 50 % of the total number of the workers of all the participating companies24. 
In case the SE has been formed by a conversion, the legal provisions, which were 
applied before the conversion shall be applied after it (Sec. 35 (1) SEBG). When the 
SE is formed by a merger or a holding or a subsidiary SE, the exact number of  
employee representatives is determined by the maximum number of employee 
representatives in any of the participating companies (Sec. 35(2) SEBG). That is the 
reason why the provisions of German law are the most likely to be applied in the case 
in which a German company participates in the formation of the SE. Being relevant with 
what has been already mentioned, is the fact that according to SEBG, employees of all 
the participating companies, even their subsidiaries, are accounted, in order to be 
estimated whether the above-mentioned thresholds are covered. It is not however clear 
whether or not this provision is conformed to Article number 7 of the Directive, which is 
referred only to the “participating companies”, which is in its turn defined in article 2(b) 
of the Directive25.  
2.3 France 
Regarding now the rules governing the involvement of the employees in 
management of those SEs which are registered in the territory of France the first thing 
we have to refer to is that the Directive has been transposed into the provisions of 
national French law by the law which was set into force on 26 July 2005, which was 
also supplemented by the decree of 9 November 2006 on the employment in the SE. 
The provisions of the above-mentioned legal instrument are applied firstly to the SEs 
which have their registered office in France, secondly to the companies which have 
                                                 
23 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 9, page 254, seventh paragraph of subchapter 30.  
24 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 9, pages 254-255, eighth paragraph of subchapter 30.  
25  Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2006), volume I, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 9, page 255, ninth and tenth paragraph of subchapter 30. 
  -11- 
their registered office in France but at the same time participate actively in the 
formation of an SE, and to their subsidiaries and establishments of an SE, which is 
located in France, but have its registered office in other member-states26. The 
procedure of the negotiations which include employee involvement in the SE start 
immediately after the establishment of the Special Negotiating Body and its duration 
may be up to six months, except for the case in which they make use of the option to 
extend the negotiations for another half a year. And in this case, as in the majority of 
the above-mentioned national legislation of the previous member-states those ones 
who are members of the Special Negotiating Body have the right to be reasonably paid 
for the whole time being off work in order to carefully perform their duties and to have  
assistance of experts. However, despite what has already been mentioned, after the 
application of Article 3(7) of the Directive, article L. 439-31 of the existing Labour Code 
provides us with the option to bear the costs of only one expert27. Regarding now the 
protection of the representatives of the employees pursuant to the article number 10 of 
the Directive and the article L. 439-47 of the French Labour Code, members of the 
SNB are protected by exactly the same grade and method against a possible dismissal 
as employee representatives do under the national French law, which is thought to be 
quite high. This practically means that in order for them to be dismissed a necessary 
prerequisite of a prior opinion of the works council is set and also the relevant 
approvement by the state employment agency, which is competent to judge upon that 
matter28. As far as the participation of employees is concerned, that matter is defined in 
details by the Article L. 439-25 of the French Labour Code as far as the grade of 
influence which can be exercised by the employee representatives upon the 
composition of the bodies of the SE is also relevant with what has been mentioned 
above29. In order to elaborate the degree of employee participation which is possible to 
be exercised in an SE in all cases, shall be determined by the participants in the 
Special Negotiating Body always being in accordance with a great variety of 
procedures, depending mainly on whether or not the SE is formed by a conversion or 
                                                 
26 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 4, page 139, first and second paragraph of subchapter 48.  
27 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 4, page 140, seventh and eighth paragraph of subchapter 50.  
28 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 4, page 141, subchapter 51.  
29 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 4, page 142, first paragraph of subchapter 55.  
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by any other possible way. In case the SE has been established by a means of a 
conversion, it is the degree of employee participation that was pre-existing in the 
current converted SA into an SE that shall also be applied. However, if the SE has 
been established by any other mean the exact method of employee participation which 
shall be applied in the SE should be exactly determined by the Special Negotiating 
Body, after careful examination of the ways in which the employees were involved in all 
the participating companies. In the case that an agreement taken inside the Special 
Negotiating Body cannot be achieved, the French national law, according to Article 7(2) 
of the Directive, says that the board of management or the board of directors of that 
certain SE shall determine the method of employee participation, saying indirectly and 
meaning actually that, irrespectively of the way the employees are involved in the 
management of the company, it should keep, under any circumstances the highest 
possible degree of employee participation in all the promoting companies30.  
2.4 Greece and Cyprus 
In order to refer to the legal status quo, which is established in Greece, we can refer 
to the fact that Directive 2001/86 was implemented by the Greek law after a significant 
delay, through presidential Decree 91/2005, published in the government gazette A92 
of 04.05.200631. Regarding the structure of the negotiating body article 3(2) of the 
presidential decree gives us the details regarding the creation of the Special 
Negotiating Body. Members of the SNB in their vast majority are determined through 
elections by the relevant trade unions. If there are no unions of that kind, the SNB 
members are elected by the works council in the concerning or relevant companies, 
pursuant to the provisions of Law 1767/1987. Finally, the provisions of article 12 of Law 
1264/1982 and Article 4 of Law 1767/1988 offer the employees the opportunity to elect 
the members of the SNB in the case in which neither a trade union nor a works council 
exists. Each one of the participating companies has the right to elect a certain number 
of representatives, a number that is analogous to the number of employees. More 
specifically it has the right to elect three if it has up to three hundred employees, five in 
the case it has between 300 and 1000 employees and finally seven if it has more than 
1000 employees. With their own turn the representatives of the employees elect 
through secret ballot a certain number of members of the Special Negotiating Body 
which is always analogous to the number of employees, who are employed by the 
                                                 
30 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, part 2, chapter 4, page 143, second, third and fourth paragraph of subchapter 55.  
31 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
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participating companies in Greece. All the necessary expenses which are related with 
the Special Negotiating Body shall be covered by the companies that participate. In 
order to give an example, the above-mentioned expenses in the majority of the cases 
are relevant to the election of the members of the Special Negotiating Body, the 
organization of the meetings of the members of the Special Negotiating Body such as 
travel and housing costs or even fees for translation and the possible fees for an expert 
who is appointed by the Special Negotiating Body in order to assist in its tasks32. 
Regarding the participation of the employees the provisions which are contained in the 
presidential decree are closely characterized identical to those of the Directive. What 
the Decree actually does is to provide us with a legal regime according to which the 
Special Negotiating Body and the administrative body of the participating companies 
have as their main targets to reach the conclusion of a written agreement which rules 
employee involvement in the SE. However, in the case that even the formal 
negotiations are not successful, the standard rules shall apply. Greece, not like other 
countries, has made use of the optional provision which is contained in Article 7(3) of 
the Directive33. Regarding the protection of employee representatives, we can refer to 
the fact that according to Article 10(1) of the presidential decree, those who are 
members of the Special Negotiating Body enjoy the same degree of protection as 
members of the works councils and trade unions. The members of the Special 
Negotiating Body are actually protected against any abusive act or omission done by 
their employers, or even third parties which act on their name and have as their target 
to impede the exercise of employee rights. The members of the Special Negotiating 
Body are additionally protected against abusive dismissal and unfavourable treatment 
and also have the right to be paid fully for the time being off in order to perform their 
representative duties and take part in conferences. Employers who do not comply with 
the above-mentioned requirements shall be subjected to sanctions such as fines of 
monetary character or a temporary closure of their business according to what article 
16 of Law 2639/1998 says34. In the national law of Cyprus there is a provision 
according to whichnational authorities have the option of opposing against a possible 
formation of an SE through merger on grounds of public interest, including the 
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33 Van Gerven Dirk and Storm Paul (ed.), “The European Company”, (2008), volume II, Cambridge 
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participation rights of employees35. In the next chapter we shall examine the general 
contribution of 2001/86/EC/Directive. 
3.General contribution of 2001/86/EC Directive 
3.1 Main achievements 
The main achievement of Council Directive 2001/86/EC is that it tried and 
succeeded, at a high important level, in making a mix of all the main European legal 
cultures always concerning of the participation of employees in the management of the 
company. The different models of employee participation which were pre-existing in 
Europe became much more clear within the framework of the SE regarding mainly the 
following four criteria: Firstly the legal structure of the corporation, secondly the 
different thresholds for company board level representation, thirdly the quotas of 
participation and finally the differences of quality regarding worker participation36. 
Regarding the sector of corporate legal structure which is actually a connecting factor 
of the board level employee representation, some of the countries have adopted the 
two-tier system, meaning that the management of the corporation is exercised through 
the board in addition to a supervisory board acting as an independent body providing 
help by incorporating at the same time employee representation. The main countries 
which have adopted that system are Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Denmark. The 
one-tier structure actually means that a single board of directors has the duties of both 
management and supervision and exists mainly in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Ireland. In the exact above-mentioned countries if there are 
representatives of the employees in the level of the board, employees’ representatives 
in their majority play the role of the non-executive directors. Finally there are also some 
countries, including France, which give the opportunity to the newly-established 
company to choose which of the above-mentioned systems they shall adopt in their 
organizations37. All the above-mentioned happening had as a result the issue of worker 
involvement in management of the company which could be resolved only through 
                                                 
35 Cremers Jan and Wolters Elwin, “EU and national company law-fixation on attractiveness”, report 120, 
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Company”, (2013), ETUI aisbl, Brussels, part 2, chapter 4, page 95, fourth paragraph of subchapter 1, 
available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2015.  
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negotiations between the company and the employees38. The first compromise, which 
was in a great degree necessary, was that of the very important principle of “before and 
after” approach. According to that approach there are two, let us call them sub-
principles.  
According to the first one this principle heads to protect the continuation of the 
highest possible level of board level employee representation in either the supervisory 
or administrative body of all the companies which are involved in the establishment of 
the SE and secondly to offer priority to the solution, which comes up through 
negotiations39.  This was common ground for all the participating member-states that 
had the intention to agree upon this solution because of the fact that others intended to 
protect in this way their pre-existing board level of employee representation and others 
wanted not to make obligatory by law a minimum, but standard level of employee 
participation in order to keep their own competitive advantage, such as the United 
Kingdom40. All the above-mentioned types of compromises had as a final result, that 
was adopted, a regulation which founds the statute for the SE and a directive regarding 
the government of the participation of employees in the SE. A so-called “Special 
Negotiating Body”, is obligatory to be formed for the period before the final agreement 
between the management and the employees regarding the exact manner and extent 
of employee participation. As it is quite easy to think from what has been said in the 
first part of that text, according to the implementing national legislation of the majority of 
the member-states of the European Union, representatives of external trade unions are 
also capable, or in some cases is obligatory, to participate in this body, even in the 
case in which they are no employees of the concerned company. If an agreement is 
reached, it supersedes the so-called standard statutory regulations accordingly to the 
annex of the Directive concerning the SE. This principle was supported by the 
European Trade Union movement, because it was the only possible way to finally 
succeed in the struggle in order for the industrial working relations all over Europe to be 
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improved, a goal of critical importance for all those who initially got the inception of the 
European Company41.   
3.2 The implications of the basic principles 
However, all the possible solutions with which the administration of Special 
Negotiating Body come up with are restricted by two very important principles. The first 
one is that which is called the “before-and-after” principle, which has already been 
examined above and by a second one, which is not other than the incursion of fall-back 
provisions, should no agreement be assigned between employers and employees. The 
fall-back or in other words standard provisions play the role of statutory provisions 
which actually have the duty of serving as benchmarks concerning the formation, 
composition and even the period of office and meetings of the Works Council of the 
SEs, the information and consultation rights which the members of the SE’s Work 
Council have and finally the representation of the workers in the administrative body. 
Furthermore it is not permitted, under any circumstances, to renounce any piece of 
information which has got through the procedure of a cross-border agreement. Usually 
those kinds of rights are exercised during the meetings of the SE Works Council. It is 
only in the case in which any Works Council in the SE has not been formed, that both 
the parties of the employers and employees must establish an alternative procedure 
regarding information and consultation, which, however, has the same minimum 
prerequisites (See Art. 4 par. 2 of the SE Directive)42. In case the negotiations are not 
possible of having results in the same period, which is between six months and a year, 
an SE Works Council, which is often called “statutory” is established having as 
members both employers’ and workers’ representatives according to the statutory 
provisions which are included in the annex of the Directive of the SE. It is worthy at that 
point to stress the fact that in the last case the SE Works Council has by far stronger 
rights compared to the case in which are applied the fall-back or in other words 
standard provisions of the pre-existing European Work Council Directive43. More 
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specifically the SE Works Council plays a significant role in which it determines in 
details exactly which people can take active part in the supervisory board. Additionally, 
there are information rights concerning matters of cross-border character. It was only 
after the recast or transformation of the European Work Council Directive, which took 
place on the fifth of June 2009 that the rules concerning the European Works Council 
Directive were aligned to the SE Works Council rights44. In this point we should stress 
that in order for Spain to agree an optional solution in the case of the SE established 
through merger is set by law . According to that case EEA countries have the option to 
exclude the standard statutory solution in national law from being applied and allow the 
establishment of the SE only if an agreement has been achieved. It should be noted, 
however, that not a single member-state of the European Union has used this optional 
provision45. However, an important precondition that had to pre-exist in order for the 
compromise to finally be reached and achieved in the Directive concerning the 
participation of the employees in the management of the SE was the principal 
recognition of the equality between the one-tier and the two-tier structure of 
management. It is common sense that the under discussion directive, had to, and as 
we nowadays know, applies to both of the above-mentioned systems of management. 
Despite the fact that there were quite a few people back at that time of the draft of the 
Directive who had a justified fear that the one-tier approach as far as the management 
of the European Company is concerned would almost be impossible to be adopted 
because of the fact that one of the most significant member-states of the European 
Union, Germany, had quite a strong and deep tradition in the sector of co-
determination, which was adopted by its national company law, the reality was finally 
completely different46.  In the next chapter we will examine what there should be done 
in order for the Directive to be improved. 
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4.The critical part 
4.1 The empirical problems 
As far as the problems which have risen during the first decade of the application of 
the provisions regarding the procedure of establishment and the participation of 
workers in the SE are concerned we should point out the fact that there is an opinion 
according to which the outcomes of the negotiation can be valid for quite a long period 
of time. However, despite what is generally known there is not a single legal provision, 
according to which a legally safeguarded specification which concerns a possible 
renegotiation, should the facts that were existing at the time the final agreement be 
reached and upon which the final agreement was reached have changed. Only in the 
case that changes regarding structure of the SE and its affected companies, either a 
subsidiary or a holding company, should be done, there is an obligation established by 
the law and according to which a re-negotiation procedure should take place (Recital 
18 of the SE Directive). The core of the above-mentioned problem is the exact reason 
why it is obligatory for a renegotiation procedure to take place only in the case of 
important structural changes. Furthermore, except for the above-mentioned problem, 
there is also a second one regarding the level of employee representation. This 
problem has two parts. The first one concerns exactly what is going to happen as far as 
the principle of “before and after” is concerned in case a renegotiation procedure is 
triggered by facts and changes concerning the structure of the company, while the 
second one has to do with the fact that a mere increase in the total number of  
employees according to the dominant opinion does not play the role of a structural 
change according to what the prevailing legal opinion supports and consequently this is 
not a legal ground for a demand for renegotiations to be successful47.  
4.2 The situation in Germany 
There is a big number of companies in Germany which use this optional provision. 
These kind of SEs , after having passed the national threshold set by the relevant law 
of that certain member-state, adopt a significantly lower threshold than the initial, which 
is obligatory under the provisions of national law regarding the representation either in 
the supervisory or administrative board. This, let us call it legal “window” which results 
in non or very much lower percentage of employee’s representation should, under any 
circumstances, close. The only way that this can be achieved is a more detailed 
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description or even legal revision of the content of the term “structural changes”. For 
example a change of the number of employees by a certain minimum percentage 
should be characterized as “structural change” in order to lead to the procedure of 
renegotiations and at the same time a solution which is standard according to the 
statute of Council Directive 2001/86/EC48.  
4.3 The problem under a more general prism 
In order to elaborate we should examine whether the so-called “protection of 
acquired rights” is actually an effective protection of the board level employee 
representation, always under the perspective according to which it has been actually 
exercised until now or it is the exact level of employee representation that is provided 
according to the law. In relevance with the standard statutory solutions we can refer to 
the fact that the above-mentioned matter is heavily depended on the actual or 
normative composition of the supervisory or administrative board. If someone refers to 
the first one, which is the method that is followed mainly in the daily basis the following 
question takes the form of what exactly is the point that during the establishment of the 
SE the enforcement of the demand for the level which is provided by the law regarding 
standard or in other words statutory rules has actually an effect. Should the SE be 
formed under a transformation, there are, I think quite obvious differences, which 
mainly come, because of the fact that in this case the main priority is the best possible 
protection of the acquired rights which have a substantive character over the autonomy 
of the negotiations. This is based in a vast degree in the safeguard, which is offered by 
the SE Directive, particularly in the Annex and in part 3a regarding worker 
representation. However, despite what so far has been mentioned, it is possible that 
laws also find “application”, which is not possible to be implemented in individual 
companies. Instead of a conclusion, we could say that the matters we have already 
referred above could be characterized by their nature as crucial and it is also of very 
crucial importance the fact that it also has to change the manner according to which 
they are dealt with in a possible revision of the SE Directive49.  
4.4 The special case of shelf SEs 
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In the case which is generally called under the term “Shelf SE” it has not been used 
by its founders as a way to bypass worker participation when the time for its activation 
has come, a much more detailed legal and actual definition of the term “structural 
change” is definitely required and an obligation by the part of the registry to also 
exercise supervisory tasks as whether all the registered companies comply with the 
fulfillment of the obligation of engaging in negotiations in order to ensure the 
participation of employees in the management of the company50.  
4.5 Limits in autonomy? 
Additionally, another significant question which rises is relevant with the limits of the 
autonomy in negotiations which the involved parties enjoy. Regarding this issue the 
autonomy of companies regarding the articles of organization autonomy and the 
autonomy of association or even the autonomy of the administrative and supervisory 
board could be characterized and treated as possible burdens on the contents of 
agreements. In the case an SE has been established through the procedure of 
transformation the agreement is under any circumstances obligatory, to offer the 
employees in the worst case the level of protection and employee involvement that 
they enjoyed before the transformation of the pre-existing company into the newly-
established SE (Art. 4, para. 4 of the SE Directive). In this respect and as far as the 
other ways of establishment are concerned the autonomy is restricted and the 
autonomy regarding the articles of association is also influenced in a negative way. As 
far as the other forms of establishment of SE are concerned, the negotiating autonomy 
can quite easily be influenced and finally restricted because of the fact that the 
percentage of the votes which are required in order for the existing level of participation 
to be reduced or to fail to even reach the threshold of the phase of negotiations can be 
influenced. A majority of two-thirds of the votes of no less than two member-states is 
needed (Art. 3, paras 4 and 6 of the SE Directive). As a result of what has already been 
happening a crucial part of the SE Directive, which can be improved is the clarification 
of that point51.  
4.5.1 Limits even in autonomy of SE Works Council? 
In this certain case we can refer in detail in the case of size and composition of the 
SE Works Council. The standard rules of the Directive set no thresholds by its legal 
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provisions, except for the case in which the national workforce is larger than the ten per 
cent of the total workforce of the company. In the above-mentioned case the countries 
involved have the entitlement according to which they have the right to require one 
more seat of a supplementary character for each ten per cent or a fraction of the 
above-mentioned percentage52. Despite the fact that the rules regarding the procedure 
of the establishment of an SE are technically the same as all the member-states of the 
European Union have adopted the same Directive, which is none other than the 
Council Directive 2001/86/EC they also have a relevant freedom to adapt the Directive 
in their national law and their legal traditions. According to the “German model” an SE 
Works Council is composed only of employees and only a seat is elected by the Works 
Council. On the other hand, according to the so-called “French model”, only a seat of 
the Works Council is chaired by the employer. However, despite the above-mentioned 
differences which exist in the composition of the SE Works Council, there is no actual 
difference in practice. The SE Works Council which has adopted the “German model” 
also has the obligation to meet the employer in bilateral meetings and the other SE 
Works Council have the obligation and the right to organize other, separate preparatory 
and follow-up meetings with the presence of the employer53.  
4.6 A critical revisit of what has already been told 
If we wanted to refer to the practical achievements and the disadvantages of the 
Works Councils, which have been shown up through the experience of the first decade 
of the application of the Statute of the SE, we could and should, of course, refer to the 
fact that the majority of the experts have stressed the importance of the value, which 
has been added to the section of the representation of the employees and which has 
either as a direct or indirect result access to information, which is of critical importance 
and the right provided to the employees, according to which they can take part in the 
central management and which is far more important for those ones of the employee 
representatives, who are outside the home country of the SE54. Additionally, some of 
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the provisions have also a significant effect regarding the workplaces on which the 
notion of social dialogue and co-operation until now had been either weak or even non-
existent55. The second main limitation of its impact stems from the fact that only very 
few SEs with employee involvement exist. This happens mainly because of the fact 
that the first initiative is obligatory to come from the companies. We still know very little 
about the motivation of the companies that actually decided to set up an SE and even 
less about the motivation of companies which have not taken such a decision. The 
structure of the SE is used by many of the companies, which have adopted that model 
in order to create leaner structures in a company of international environment56.  
4.7 The study of “Ernst & Young” 
A study made by “Ernst & Young”, in 2009 regarding the impact of the statute of the 
SE, which is commissioned by the European Union, makes the conclusion that the 
process of the employee involvement is considered as a negative driver, specifically for 
those of the member-states which have a national legal system according to which the 
existence of a system of employee participation is not allowed. However, this kind of 
argument is quite difficult to be understood because of the existence of the principle of 
before-and-after regarding the standard rules of the Directive of the SE according to 
which it is not obligatory for those companies which in the past didn't have a system of 
employee participation to adopt new rights of employee participation. In the case the 
decision-makers of the companies have expressed such opinions as those which are 
referred to in the report of the “Ernst & Young”, maybe it is a strong indication of a not 
so sufficient knowledge of the relevant legal provisions57.  
4.8 The contribution of the European Commission and the “BUSINESSEUROPE” 
Regarding now the effort, which has been done in order to stress the disadvantages 
of the SE Directive and, if possible, to be corrected we should refer to the effort which 
has been done by the European Commission in September 2008 and had as a result 
that the SE Directive was not in need of any amendment or specification because of 
the fact that at that time there was an actual lack of experience as far as the  
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application of the national legal provisions which transpose the relevant Directive are 
concerned58.  It was at the same time that the confederation of the European 
Employers’ named BUSINESSEUROPE had the view that the rules which govern 
employee participation and all the necessary requirements being a prerequisite of the 
set-up of a Special Negotiating Body were also a substantial burden which stopped 
companies to make greater use of the European Company Statute. It was also at that 
time that the Confederation BUSINESSEUROPE made a proposal in order to increase 
significantly the number of the SEs and their flexibility as there was also a need of 
strengthening the autonomy of negotiations which the social partners enjoyed in the 
level of company and by doing so also allowed the agreed solutions which were 
tailored according to the needs of the company and its employees to be applied59. In its 
communication the European Commission also stressed another problem, which was 
connected, at that time with the relatively high number of the SEs, which were 
established without having employees and, as a direct consequence of the fact that 
without having done any negotiations concerning employee involvement and 
acknowledging the enlarging problems of the SEs established by themselves, that was 
already active in  that period and without even any negotiations having taken place, it 
reached possibly a wrong conclusion60. Basically what the experts of the SEEurope 
tried to do and in a great degree finally achieved was to stress that the employee 
involvement is not just another issue of technical character, but it is an element of 
major importance for the establishment of an SE that it has to be assessed from the 
perspective of the rights that all the employees have to enjoy and not from the 
perspective of the side of the employers as it has been done in the case of the paper of 
the Commission. The majority of the experts who were involved in that investigation, 
pointed out the fact that the right of participation in management of the workers sets as 
a necessary prerequisite the existence of more dynamic provisions and not the 
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preservation of existing practices61. Despite the fact that there is a specific procedure, 
there is always the risk of manipulation concerning those situations which are related to 
poor representation of workers, for example the situations related to the activation of 
shelf SEs and that is the main reason why it has to be legislated with more details and 
that certain point more strictly 62. The quite small number of the established or now 
under the procedure of  establishment SE companies, is mostly related to other factors 
and not the fear of losing the already established employee participation rights. The 
main fears are connected with, for example, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 
analogously with the flexibility of the pre-existing national law regarding companies and 
other possible motivations or disincentives, for example and not restrictively, the fact of 
whether or not there is a lack of clear financial and fiscal incentives for the 
companies63. As far as the second main problematic area, that which is relevant with 
the lack of legal certainty, is concerned, the experts of the SEEurope Institution have 
very boldly stressed the fact that the Directive neither makes an address regarding 
certain aspects of the procedure of negotiation, nor makes a reference to certain 
situations, such as cases in which no employees are eligible or have the desire of 
being elected a member of the Special Negotiating Body64. That means that in order for 
the SE Directive to be improved the possibilities of making a bypass regarding the 
negotiations on the section of worker involvement must be blocked. In the case that 
this is not going to happen it would be more than sure the fact that the activation of 
shelf SEs will lead to an automatic way to negotiations, which will take place under the 
rules which were pre-existing since the time of the initial establishment of the SE. The 
above-mentioned focus on the period of the establishment of the SE company does 
not, under any circumstances take under account the fact that during its life a company 
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is very possible to be subjected to changes regarding its size, purpose, structure, the 
registered seat and many other characteristics of  it.. It is also of great significance the 
fact that the experts of the SE have stressed that in the case a future revision of the 
Directive takes place, the revision should cover not only the Regulation, but also the 
Directive as a whole65. The SE makes a strong statement that the establishment of 
shelf SEs by providers, who are dedicated can be explained in a great degree by the 
fact that in some countries being a member-state of the European Union the fact of 
making shelf companies available for sale is very common. The Commission’s only 
note has to do with the fact that the organizations of workers point out the fact that the 
constitution of shelf SEs maybe used as a circumvemtial measure of the SE Directive. 
At any time the revision of the SE legislation, meaning both the Regulation and the 
Directive should take place it, is of a major importance to be decided, even in advance, 
to which kind of both the pre-existing and those which are going to be established 
companies the constitution of the SE has to be more attractive. It is actually the 
opinion, which is dominant in everyday practice that the reputation of the SE suffers in 
the eyes of important companies in the European economy. However, to become even 
more flexible and simplified the SE Statute would be of little help, if not of a zero one. 
We could say, without even exaggerating that, under certain circumstances and 
requirements, there is a serious risk of abuse, of the constitution of the SE66. In the 
next chapter we will try to take into account the general impact of the general European 
legal framework 
5.The impact of the general European legal framework 
5.1 Possible reforms of EU Company Law 
As far as the possible future legal framework of protection of workers under the EU 
company law is concerned, we can refer back to our original question which was how 
exactly the European company Law can be reformed to assist more effectively the 
interests of the workers. The first section, which we should point out is the fact that 
legislation should determine with more details what is meant under the phrase 
“interests of the company” and secondly which kind of management is going to be 
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more respected in a pluralist legal framework67. Legal rules which require  
management as a prerequisite in order for a pluralistic approach to be adopted can be 
found in many legal orders. Despite the fact that the group of stakeholders has a quite 
varied form, workers are always being treated according to a special status in this 
context68. In these provisions, is the notion included, which is inherent in article 14(2) of 
the basic law in Germany according to which, the use of property of the company 
should, apart from other purposes, assist the public good and legislation regarding the 
board-level participation of workers69. However, as far as the popularity of the notion of 
the shareholder value is concerned, which was emerged in the 1990’s and continued to 
be expanding in the first decade of the 21st century, certain writers, who are experts in 
this field, started to express their doubts as far as the pluralistic approach, which is 
adopted by the majority of companies in Germany, is the right approach70. As a 
consequence of that it is of particular interest the connection in section 309 of the 
British Companies Act of 1985, which, since then, has been repealed, and at least 
theoretically, has mitigated that general focus only as far as the interests of 
shareholder are concerned. Its wording was the following: “The matters to which the 
directors of a company regard the performance of their functions include the interests 
of the company’s employees’ in general as well as the interest of its members”. 
However, the fact that it lacks enforceability has been seen as a problem. As a part of 
the recent reforms in company law, that certain provision has been repealed by the 
British Companies Act 2006 and was even replaced by a watered-down provision of 
the new section 17271. However, in the final phase of the British notion of the corporate 
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governance, the main focus remains in the interests of the shareholders. In the case in 
which, before the structural reforms of 2006, the kind of protection, which was provided 
to employees as stakeholders was thought to be even then weak, then the opinion 
about the new legal framework would have been thought to be even worse 72 .The 
other statutes in this section are believed not to be indicative of the philosophy of the 
legislation, which is inherent in company law73 . As it has already been mentioned, the 
establishment of a legislative system of a pluralistic character sets as a necessary 
requirement the supplementing of legal enforcement mechanisms74. A first step 
towards the improvement of the existing legal framework concerning the board-level 
worker and employee participation is that which sets as a prerequisite the introduction 
of an independent standard established by the European Union regarding participation 
of workers in the various models of corporations, which are organized under the law of 
European Union. This is a very important opportunity of reducing and in the best-case 
scenario removing the deficits of the existing model of SE while its most possible result 
would be such according to which the existing forms of corporation will become much 
more attractive by the perspective of the employees75. As far as the minimum threshold 
is concerned regarding the size of the company, which is needed in order for the 
introduction of this newly-established independent EU notion of board-level worker 
representation to be initiated, it would be more appropriate to comply with the provision 
of the article 8 of the SCE Directive, meaning to set the relevant threshold at 
approximately 50 employees76. In the case that no agreement can be reached 
regarding the matter of whether or not a legal provision concerning the kind of 
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participation of workers can be established, it would be better for both the workers and 
the owners of the company to abandon entirely the whole SE and its relevant SPE 
project77.  
5.2 The indirect potentials of certain countries 
As long as the constitutional bodies and the countries, which are member-states of 
the European Union and at the same time can also exercise some influence, for 
example Germany, do not actively take part in the promotion, through its adoption, of 
the company model, which has been described, employees are obliged by the reality 
they deal with on a daily basis to ensure their access to more conventional and 
common measures in order to safeguard the fact that they will have quite a significant 
contribution in the decision-making process in the company, in which they are 
employees78.  
5.3 Is there actual internal competition? 
Additionally, another reason for not choosing the model of the European Company 
is the fact that as far as provisions regarding participation of employees are concerned, 
we can refer to the fact that the provisions regarding the participation of employees are 
far more flexible under the legal framework of the EC Merger Directive, compared to 
those ones of the SE statute79. In their conclusion, the authors of “Ernst and Young” 
make the statement that those companies, which are registered in the countries, which 
have adopted the one-tier corporate governance system and at the same time without 
employee participation are in general lines quite reluctant as far as the establishment of 
European Companies is concerned, because of the fact that they strongly believe that 
this kind of company constitution has by far more disadvantages compared to the 
national public limited liability companies80. In the next chapter we will try to find out 
what the basic remarks of the general legal framework are. 
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6.Remarks of the general legal framework 
6.1 Is it possible to offer a real protection to the employees? The cases of Czech 
Republic and Germany 
As far as whether or not the legal framework of the European Company offers an, 
even indirect, way of circumventing the rights regarding the board-level-employee-
representation is concerned, we can stress the fact that some researchers have made 
the conclusion, according to which, the legal framework of the European Company 
helps not to safeguard the pre-existing Board-level-employee-representation rights and 
additionally, it seems that the Statute of the European Company offers three more 
bypass strategies: First of all, the actual avoidance of the rights of the Board-level-
employee-representation, secondly, a possible “freeze” of the Board-level-employee-
representation-rights and thirdly a possible reduction of the number of  seats, which 
have been allocated to the board-level-employee-representatives, specifically in those 
cases, in which they are occupied by the external trade unionists81. As far as the first 
strategy is concerned, that which aims to avoid the implementation of the Board-level-
employee-representative rights, the main justification is the following: In accordance 
with the “before and after” principle, a company, which has not adopted Board-level-
employee-representation rights yet has no obligation to offer its employees the right of 
having representatives in the board level. Because of the fact that the adoption or not 
of the Board-level-employee-representation rights depends a great deal on the size of 
the human workforce that the company has, those companies, which have a national 
character have the optional choice of adopting the statute of the European Company 
even before they reach the threshold set by the national company law of that certain 
member-state, which in the opposite case would have driven the implementation of the 
representatives of the board-level. For example, in the Czech Republic, the threshold 
set by the national company law for the implementation of the Board-level-employee-
representative right is quite low, as it is covered only by 50 employees. This strategy of 
avoidance is one of the main factors, as there is no real data, of the fact that in that 
specific member-state of the European Union there is quite a high number of officially 
registered European Companies. Another example of this kind is also that according to 
which German companies which are quite close to the threshold set by the national 
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company law, which in that case has 500 employees, which triggers the procedure of 
the implementation of the one-third Board-level-employee-representation rights, 
choose to opt for the statute of the European Company, always of course in the case in 
which they also have all of the prerequisites for doing this82. As far as the second 
strategy of “by-pass” is concerned, that of the “freeze” of the Board-level-employee-
representation rights, this is mainly followed by those companies, which have already 
implemented this kind of rights, but at the same time want to avoid any tend of increase 
in them. Companies, which are far more vulnerable in adopting that perspective are the 
German ones, because of the fact that it is quite easy for them to respect two other 
requirements, which are set as a prerequisite in order for them to adopt the European 
Company model and which are the following: First of all the obligation for a company 
which is already subjected to the one-third Board-level-employee-representation rights 
to adopt parity board-level-employee-representation rights as soon as it goes closer to 
the threshold of 2.000 employees and at the same time the obligation for the German 
companies to adapt the size of their board in accordance and analogically to the 
number of their employees. The consequence of the above-mentioned occurrence is 
that the German companies, which are quite close to the threshold set by the national 
German law, which is that of 2.000 employees have many possibilities to choose to 
adopt the European Company’s Statute in order to keep the one-third Board-level-
employee-representation-right, such as GFK SE83. In the next chapter we will focus on 
the possible future dangers and the importance of the critical mass. 
7.Possible future potentials and dangers 
7.1 The negative impact of privatisations 
As far as the enemies regarding the Board-level-employee-representation are 
concerned, the most important are privatisations, as a mere consequence of the global 
financial crisis, because of the fact that they trigger a direct procedure of reductions in 
the extent of the Board-level-employee-representation rights, especially in those 
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countries, where such rights are limited only to the State-owned companies84. Despite 
what has been already mentioned the general trends inside the European Union show 
that the Board-level-employee-representation rights, despite the serious efforts, which 
are currently being made in order for them to be vanished, partially or totally, they still 
resist, despite the fact that in many cases in an uneven manner and despite the fact 
that some countries have abolished or diminished them85. Another factor of pressure 
for the employee participation rights both under the provisions of the European 
Company Statute and the BLER rights provided by the national company law of the 
member-states of the European Union is the fact that the rulings of the European Court 
of Justice allow, independently of the fact that this happens in most cases indirectly, 
companies to keep indulging a regime shopping86. Additionally, significant concerns 
have been also arisen, because of the fact that despite procedures of employees’ 
consultation and information are governed by labour law BLER rights governed by the 
company law87. However, despite the fact that quite a few things have been written as 
far as participation of the employees in the management of the company is concerned, 
the majority of the arguments and debates deal with problems, which have their roots 
in the theory and are at the same time a little bit of encyclopedic character. It would be 
as a consequence, of great importance to refer to that kind of problems which deal with 
matters caused by the enforcement of the above-mentioned theoretical approaches on 
a daily basis88.  
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7.2 The significance of the existence of the critical mass 
In order to elaborate the data of the constitution of the board confirm that there has 
to exist a “critical mass” of representatives of the workers in order for them to exert 
power over corporate decision-making89. Those representatives who work in the 
subsidiaries report the fact that they can exert far less influence than their counterparts 
in the independent companies90. Another point which should be taken into account is 
the fact that only a minority of approximately 40% of the workers who participated in 
the research believe that decisions are actually taken in the official meetings of the 
board. That percentage rises to 65% in the new member-states, something that has to 
be taken into account91 . Despite the fact that until now the main focus has been on the 
formal side of the participation of the employees in the management of the company, 
through that research, which has been made under the model of policy brief, the matter 
has been raised of how exactly the existing piece of legislation can be transferred in 
practice92. As far as the concern of whether it is possible to be even more strengthened 
the integrated architecture of the involvement of workers in companies which use the 
company law instruments implemented under the company law of the European Union, 
for example the model which we currently examine, which is that of the SE, there has 
been a call for a new Directive to be introduced and according to be introduced 
ambitious minimum standards which will regard mainly the field of cross-border 
situations93. In the next chapter we will try to make a theoretical approach of the 
participation of employees in the management of the European Company under the 
Catholic Social Thought.   
                                                 
89 Conchon Aline and Waddington Jeremy, ETUI Policy Brief: “Participation rights in practice: what are 
the power bases of worker representatives at the board?”, no. 10/2015, September 2015, ETUI aisbl, 
Brussels, chapter 3, page 4, paragraph 5, available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016. 
90 Conchon Aline and Waddington Jeremy, ETUI Policy Brief: “Participation rights in practice: what are 
the power bases of worker representatives at the board?”, no. 10/2015, September 2015, ETUI aisbl, 
Brussels, chapter 3, pages 4-5, paragraph 7, available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016. 
91 Conchon Aline and Waddington Jeremy, ETUI Policy Brief: “Participation rights in practice: what are 
the power bases of worker representatives at the board?”, no. 10/2015, September 2015, ETUI aisbl, 
Brussels, chapter 3, page 5, paragraph 8, available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016. 
92 Conchon Aline and Waddington Jeremy, ETUI Policy Brief: “Participation rights in practice: what are 
the power bases of worker representatives at the board?”, no 10/2015, September 2015, ETUI aisbl, 
Brussels, chapter 4, pages 5-6,  paragraph 2, available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016.  
93 Conchon Aline and Waddington Jeremy, ETUI Policy Brief: “Participation rights in practice: what are 
the power bases of worker representatives at the board?”, no. 10/2015, September 2015, ETUI aisbl, 
Brussels, chapter 4, page 6, paragraph 3, available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016. 
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8. The Participation of employees under Catholic Social Thought 
8.1 The deep meaning of charity 
The concept of charity is not an exclusively personal taste, but it is an element which 
has been recorded deeply in human nature. Benedict XVI has very boldly stressed in 
his work titled “Caritas in Veritate” that action of charity is also a factor, which affects 
very seriously human relationships and at the same time is one of the main forces 
leading to the improvement of the human nature94.  
8.2 The core of the Catholic Social Thought  
Catholic Social Thought states that social structures should be directed to the inner 
self-realization of each one of the individuals. Participation of employees in the 
Societas Europaea is a kind of realization of that statement95. 
Conclusions 
In order to make a final conclusion the deep spirit of Directive 2001/86/EC is very 
important as far as it shows clearly the direction, which has to be followed in the sector 
of the participation of employees in all the company models established under the law 
of the European Union and at the same time it has quite a large number of practical 
disadvantages deriving mainly from the not so systematic way that it is described in the 
provisions of Directive 2001/86/EC regarding the establishment and participation of 
employees in the constitution of the Societas Europaea. It has to be changed in a great 
degree, almost totally, in order to actually and practically play the role of a benchmark 
in the participation and representation of employees and help the European Union 
overcome the period of crisis through strengthening of employee rights in order to 
                                                 
94 Lower Michael, “Employee Participation in Governance A legal and ethical analysis”, (2010), 
Cambridge University Press, UK, introduction, pages 2-3, seventh paragraph of subchapter titled 
“employee participation as an ethical issue”, available in https: //books. google.com. 
cy/books?id=20WVenKjeZMC&pg=PA179&lpg=PA179&dq=employee+participation+european+, in 
8/1/2017.  
95 Lower Michael, “Employee Participation in Governance A legal and ethical analysis”, (2010), 
Cambridge University Press, UK, introduction, page 3, eighth paragraph of subchapter titled “employee 
participation as an ethical issue”, available in 
https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=20WVenKjeZMC&pg=PA179&lpg=PA179&dq=employee+particip
ation+ european+, in 8/1/2017.  
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avoid the situation which is described in the fourth scenario of the book “Worker 
participation 2030 Four scenarios”96. 
 The main changes that have to be made are the change of the general legal 
framework that is relevant with the adoption of the Societas Europaea and to offer 
more space only to those (people, companies and organizations) who and which are 
really interested in promoting the above-mentioned constitution. The changes of that 
character are those which are connected with the participation of employees, their 
protection of possible procedures of abusive character and in general every provision 
that is closely connected with the participation of employees in the management of the 
company and their protection. If all the above-mentioned actions are integrated, then 
the success of the Societas Europaea will be much more certain than today.   
 
                                                 
96 Stollt Michael and Meinert Sascha (ed.), “Worker participation 2030 Four scenarios”, (2010), ETUI 
aisbl, Brussels, chapter titled “Scenarios (long version)”, scenario titled “lost cake”, pages 55-60, 
available in the site of ETUI (www.etui.org) in 12/11/2016. 
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Appendix 
1) ArbVG = “Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz” (“Austrian Labour Constitution 
Act”) 
2) BLER = “Board level employee representation” (rights) 
3) Dir = “Directive”  
4) EC = “European Commission” or “European Communities” 
5) EEA = “European Economic Area” 
6) EU = “European Union”  
7) SA = “Societe Anonyme” (The French Term for the “Limited Company”) 
8) SCE = “Societas Cooperativa Europaea” 
9) SE = “Societas Europaea” 
10) SEBG = “SE Beteiligungsgesetz” (The German term for the “SE 
Employee Involvement Act”).  
11) SNB = “Special Negotiating Body” 
12) SPE = “Societas Privata Europaea” 
13) UK= “United Kingdom”  
Whereas is referred the term “Directive” or “the Directive” or “SE Directive” it 
stands for the Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the 
statute for a European Company with regard to the involvement of employees. 
Whereas is referred the term “Regulation” or “the Regulation” or “SE Regulation” it 
stands for the Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the 
Statute for a European Company (SE).   
 
